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Ce travail s'insere dans le cadre général de l'anthropologie de 
la religion. Aprés un survol rapide de la tradition durkheimienne, 
les auteurs examinent quelques contributions de l'approche inter-
prétative de Clifford Geertz à l'étude des significations des phéno-
ménes religieux. 
Resumo 
Este artigo insere-se no quadro geral da antropologia da 
religião. Em primeiro lugar, os autores passam em revista a tradição 
clássica de Émile Durkheim para examinar, em seguida, algumas 
contribuições da antropologia interpretativa de Clifford Geertz para 
a análise dos fenómenos religiosos. 
* Professores no Departamento de Sociologia, da Universidade de 
Ottawa (Canadá). 
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«A re/igio11 is a system of symbols which acts 
to establish powerful, pervasive, and long· 
lasting moods and motivations in men by 
formulating conceptio115 with such em aura 
of factuality that the moods a11d motivariam 
seem uniquely realistic». 
(GEERTZ 1966: 4) 
Social scientific approaches to the study of religious 
phenomena have a long history and each generation of scholars 
has to some extent built upon as well as reacted against the 
work of their predecessors. This paper will briefly examine 
the work of Clifford Geertz against the backdrop context 
of the Durkheimian functionalist tradition long dominant 
in the field. 
The structural-functional approach associated with the 
work of Emile Durkheim and his followers has been arguably 
the most influential perspective on religion for most of this 
century. Durkheim's definition, according to which 
<<A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices reJa-
tive to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and 
forbidden - beliefs and practices which unite in to one single 
moral community called a Church, ali those who adhere to 
them>> (DURKHEIM 1965: 62). 
is the hallmark example of a functional definition of religion. 
In this type of definition, religion is defined by what it does. 
These definitions are often contrasted to substantive definitions, 
which attempt to define what religion is. 
The choice between a functional and a substantive defini-
tion is a matter of strategy. The main advantage of a functional 
definition strategy is its breadth: it encourages researchers 
to be sensitive to the religious character of a whole range of 
social settings. A disadvantage of a functionalist definition is 
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that it implies that society has certain functional requisites, 
some of which are uniquely fulfilled by religion (McGuire 
1981: 8). We shall return to this important point shortly. 
In the Durkheimian perspective, religion is made up of 
beliefs and rituais, and the two are connected (cf. Collin 1982: 
chapter 2). The basic religious belief is the dualism of and oppo-
sition between the sacred and the profane. The sacred is 
dangerous, ominous, awe-inspiring, and supremely important. 
The profane includes just about everything else: profane things 
can be dealt with matter-of-factly and routinely without any 
special preparation and whatever one's mood. Rituais are 
«procedures by which people must conduct themselves in the 
presence of things that they believe to be sacred» (Collins 
1982: 34). In similar fashion, the opposite of these two are 
also related: non-ritual behavior is that which is appropriate 
in the presence of the profane. To Durkheim, the rituais 
of assembled social groups reinforce the sacred character of 
the group itself. 
The Durkheimian approach to religion, as developed in the 
work of Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown and other scholars, has 
been subjected to a wide range of criticism in the past few 
decades. For example, in an influential symposium held in the 
1960's and devoted to anthropological treatments of religion 
(Symposium 1963), it was evident a fair number of contem-
porary scholars were at the very least dissatisfied with the 
work of their immediate predecessors. A notable body of 
opinion carne out in favor of a re-channeling of energies from 
the accepted sociofunctional mode of analysis to a study of 
religion in itself, as a prerequisite to examining its role in 
society. Primitive belief and practice, for so long construed 
almost a priori as nurturing group solidarity, were badly in 
need of attention in their own right. The criticism was force-
fully advanced that the kind of synchronic functionalism that 
had become popular was in fact often mired in tautology and 
simplistic truisms (e.g. society requires cultural integration; 
religion is what provides cultural integration, therefore religion 
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is a requisite for society's existence; cf. McGuire 1982: 8). 
The view became widespread that synchronic functionalism 
deserved a «rethinking», not only with respect to religious 
phenomena but in the study of other areas of sociallife as well. 
The traditional structural/functional mode of analysis 
which has come to be associated with the work of Malinowski 
and Radcliffe-Brown, postulated that society can be treated as 
an organism with certain basic needs, and that certain institu-
tions fulfill identifiable functions in the operation of the organic 
whole. In addition to the problem of circularity or tautology 
just mentioned, two further deficiences of the traditional 
structurallfunctional mode of analysis may be cited in respect 
to religious interpretations. Generally speaking, many scholars 
have argued that such an approach is incapable of dealing with 
change and the possible social and individual disharmonies 
that come with it. More specifically, in many functionalist 
analyses the meaning of primitive belief and practice was 
sacrificed, either to the domain of psychology or as irrelevant 
to the delineation of social functions. The difficulties of 
handling change were of course mitigated by the type of system 
studied. As long as field research remained tied to the concept 
of the small-scale, homogeneous community the latent inflexi-
bility of the structural/functional method remained disguised. 
An important point is that «function » is only to be main-
tained by virtue of religious belief on the individual plane. 
A latent function, by definition, is not intended by the actor. 
Thus, and particularly on a social basis, functional religion 
cannot in any way account for or explain continued adherence 
to beliefs on the part of individuais. To try to maintain such 
a viewpoint is to substitute effects for causes. To explain the 
role of religion in society is not therefore to explain religion 
but to explain society. And such was the substance of Durk-
heim's thesis: God represents society. Religious symbols mobi-
lize and concretize sentiments and values of social solidarity. 
Durkheim's ultimate position exemplified in The Elementary 
Forms of the Religious Life has been critized because of its 
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apparent circularity: the postulated autonomous moral force 
of the social is ultimately traced back to the very sentiments 
it was believed to inspire. Yet in a sense, this circularity is only 
empirical, and not logical : it occurs whenever there is a process 
of feedback at work. Collectively enacted rituais reinforce 
sentiments of social solidarity, which in turn reinforce the 
belief in the sacred, and so on. This dynamic feedback process 
has been hidden from view in many traditional analyses, and 
is brought into the foreground in the works of Geertz, as we 
shall see shortly. 
The selection of symbols is a topic which Durkheim largely 
left unanswered. It would seem that the religious nature of the 
symbol, its sacred segregation from the profane world, is an 
arbitrary imposition of the collective conscience. The actual 
mechanics of this bestowal were never documented by the 
Durkheim school. Later on other authors, attempting to 
substantiate his thesis, proposed somewhat more conclusive 
criteria. Radcliffe-Brown deemed a symbol sacred because it 
was first of all useful to society. Retaining Durkheim's field 
of inquiry -totemism- we can note Lévi-Strauss's declara-
tion, that is to say that totems are excellent fodder for thought. 
Fortes, largely on the basis of Tallensi totemism saw totems 
as enmeshed in the syndrome of jurai rights that character-
ized the lineage as a corporate group. Although Lévi-Strauss's 
proposal could, and does, have a societal aspect, it more deeply 
reflects the analogical and sensible mode of ordering the world 
which Lévi-Strauss sees as the way of being of primary thought. 
While «intellectualizing» what in Durkheim ultimately became 
a recourse to sentiments Lévi-Strauss's anthropology is a 
formal presentation of sy~bolic systems which, with Durk-
heim, cannot differentiate them in value terms, and avoids, as 
against Durkheim, the complexities of their sacred isolation 
by subsuming symbols in a general theory of mind. The focal 
significance of religious symbolism for any approach which 
assigns equal weight to social, cultural and individual variables 
is dealt with by Clifford Geertz in a number of studies of 
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Javanese society. In coming to grips with the flaws of static
functionalism Geertz provides both more adequate metho-
dology («dynamic» functionalism), and a more comprehensive
perspective to anthropological approaches to religion.
Geertz's definition of religion, with which we began this
paper, shares with Durkheim's definition a common member-
ship in that large family of functional approaches to defining
religion. Geertz is, however, much more specific abouth the
dynamic mechanism involved in the creation of meaning for
individuais on the one hand, and the creation of social
solidarity in a group, on the other. For Geertz, religion is man's
mode of expressing the fundamental nature of reality. He
differentiates between the moral-aesthetic aspects of culture
— designated as «ethos»— and the cognitive-existential
elements for which he reserves the term «world view». Religion
supplies the conceptual bond between these two perspectives,
synthesized in sacred symbols. «Religious symbols», says
Geertz, «formulate a basic congruence between a particular
style of life and a specific metaphysic, and in so doing sustain
each with the borrowed authority of the other» (Geertz 1966).
This dialectic of the ideal and the actual is a theoretical
ramification of Geertz's general insistence upon the dynamic
interrelationship between the cultural and the social. «Culture»,
as an «historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied
in symbols», supplies both a basis and a source of interpreta-
tion for organized behavior patterns, which for our purposes
here, can be considered «social structure». Culture, and there-
fore religion, is thus primarily a symbolic system. Following
Sorokin, Geertz distinguishes between «causal-functional»
integration and «logico-meaningful» integration. Whereas the
former reflects the state of society on the ground —Durkheim's
social morphology— and can be adequately studied in
structural-functional terms, the latter concept signifies the
cultural dimension of the is and its meaningful justification
in ethical and cognitive terms. The logico-meaningful plane is
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symbolic and its meanings feedback into the social structure







That disharmonies and dysfunctions can ensue from reli
gious beliefs and practices is particularly evident in situations
when the cultural and social planes, idealy interdependent,
become independent and often conflicting. Geertz illustrates
this in his account of the disruption he observed at a funeral
ceremony in urban Java (Geertz 1957). In this kind of situation
the normative, rather than validating behavior, tends to under-
mine it. Leaving change aside, let us examine Geertz s concep-
tualizaton of sacred symbols. The latter, as already suggested,
fuse facticity with value in a meaningful synthesis. There are,
Geertz believes, (and his evidence does indicate quite some
support for this), a limited number of such synthesizing
symbols in any culture.
For Geertz, religion is made up of this «cluster» of sacred
symbols which constitutes the Javanese «Weltanschaaung».
Adherence to the meaning embodied in the symbol complex
is a criterion of social acceptibility. Quoting Geertz: «In Java,
small children, simpletons, boors, the insane, and the flagrantly
immoral are ali said to be not yet Javanese and not yet human»
(Geertz 1970:277).
Javanese religion is rendered even more relevant to a
study of sacred symbols by the simultaneous presence of
Hindu/Buddhist, islamic and traditional animistic belief
systems. Each has its own symbolic cluster with functions to
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sustain differing marriages of ethos and world-view within the
overall context of Indonesian culture. As far as these variants
co-exist in specific spatial and social contexts, there is little
conflict between them. In fact, one discerns beneath the dissi-
milarities an overriding sense of a common culture. Most
prominent here is a general emphasis on a «phenomenology
of feeling», «slamet». Everyone in life seeks «slamet» — well
being. The «slametan» as a basic core ritual, despite its
differing symbolic efficacy in pagan, Islamic and Hindu/Budd-
hist contexts, runs the whole gamut of Javanese society. It may,
in its general stress on commensality of men and the spirit
world, constitute the most elemental of religious symbols of
the entire human kind.
The cooperative ethic of the «slametan» is, however,
endowed with mystical validification and is coterminous with
the intent of attaining «slamet» — that peculiarly negative
disengagement from the affairs and tribulations of a this-
-worldly existence.
If the principal function of ritual is said to be the contri-
bution it makes to the maintenance of social structure, anth-
ropology can set aside what Nadei has called those «concerns»
and «capacities» of religious systems which are geared to the
belief that life is comprehensible. At least in the sense of there
being somewhere «another world to live in ... whether we expect
ever to pass wholly over into it» (Santayana) which gives a reve-
lation to life and makes it what we call as «liveable». As has
been made clear, Geertz does not deny the possible sociofunc-
tional role of religion. Indeed, his definition of religion falls
squarely in the broad functionalist tradition. Rather he viewed
the emphasis on the social dimension in many traditional
analyses to be inadequate and incomplete. The most impor-
tant feature of religion, for Geertz, is its role in providing an
integrated meaning system for individuais and for society as
a whole.
Religion itself can be abstract and practical simultaneously,
as is understandable when we take in consideration the Java-
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nese concept of «rasa». The latter in addition to being a
concept of truth, beauty and goodness, is also a preferred
mode of experiencing, a kind of affectless detachment. The
question in a cross-cultural framework is how far men's ulti-
mate visions influence their everyday behavior. The answer is
to be looked for in the confluence of culture and social organi-
zation and can be determined only by first making exhaustive
analyses of ultimate meaning systems; the same would be to
say symbols.
Geertz's theoretical position derives from the work of Mead
and Kardiner, the existentialist philosophers, symbolists such
as Cassirer and Langer, as well as more generally on Weber
and what is generally known as the «verstehen» approach. It
is also evident that as a student of Parsons, Geertz is concerned
with fusing ali these influences in order to «humanize» a Grand
Theory that has often proved difficult to use in empirical
research. Geertz's work can be seen as an attempt to forge a
middle ground between that positivism which even denies expe-
rience and the formalism that abstracts so far as to divorce
itself from reality. And thus, with Langer, we find him direc-
ting anthropology's attentions towards the concept of meaning,
manifested in symbols, as «the dominant philosophical concept
of our time». Symbols and meaning, he argues, are well worth
our somewhat belated interest.
It is the phenomenological status that Geertz attributes
to religious symbolizing that is so well brought out and
explained in his study of Javanese religion. Religion here has
its motivating force conceived to lie in the «fidelity with which
it expresses the fundamental nature of reality». Action, and
the interpretation of action, world-view and ethos, find common
unity of expression in the sum of general meanings existent
in, and constitutive of, a considered culture. In the every-day
world of behavior one only finds the manifestation, the
continuai working-out, and the aspired-to reflection of inner
states of being.
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The «SLAMETAN» in its «ABANGAM» form, is a «rude»
protege of the refined «phenomenology of feeling» epitomized
in the «WAJANG», the «PRIJAJI» shadow play which merges
the aesthetic with the moral, the artistic with the religious
(Geertz 1958). But the continuity and indifferentiability of the
ideal and the actual are bound together in the character of
«SEMEAR». The latter, the «lowest» and most earthy personage
of the «WAJANG», recalls the link with the village life in his
representation of the exigencies of real life as opposed to the
idealistic view suscribed by the «PRIJAJIS». The realities of
human ineptitude which the «SLAMETAN» mitigates but cannot
transcend are also in «SEMAR».
As Geertz notes when he makes a comparison of the
«WAJANG» with Shakespearian drama, both «Semar» and
Falstaff provide a rather general criticis, of the very values the
dramas in which they are included affirm. They furnish a
reminder that, despite over-proud assertations to the contrary,
no completely adequate human world-view is possible; and that
behind ali the pretense to absolute and ultimate knowledge,
the sense for the irrationality of human life ... does remain»
(Geertz 1966).
And this is precisely why, of course, symbols cannot escape
their human and natural referents. Symbols, like scientific
knowledge, can be bent to the most devious human doctrines.
Looking at the contemporary world it is not overstating the
case to point out the destructiveness as well as the construc-
tive powers of the symbol. The crises in the Middle East and
the Persian Gulf are particularly exemplary of the relevance
of our analysis of sacred symbols. But secular symbols are
equally, if not more so, precipitants of conflicts between
individuais and nations. The present antagonisms within the
United States and Canada are largely to be understood as
fervent disagreements over concepts such as «freedom»,
«liberty», «justice», «equality» and the like. If humans rose
from their primordial, muddy beginnings through the ability
to symbolize, it may yet prove to be a specialization the limita-
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tions of which far may well surpass those of any physiological
«cul-de-sac» that humans might possibly have entered. Symbols
could conceivably constitute both the human species' salva-
tion and at the same time they could also be its doom.
In studies of religion, anthropology has rarely considered
belief systems as expressivo, in Tillich's phrase, of «ultimate
concerns». Such research is manifested most often in the works
of French scholars. Griaule, Deiterlen, and Dumont, in África
and Asia, have made great advances in demonstrating cosmol-
ogies and philosophies as being no simple reflection of social
structures. Nevertheless, such findings tend to portray myths
and beliefs as autonomous and often constitutivo of social
structure. Such a position is as much to be faulted as that of
the Radcliffe-Browm, structuralist variety. The fact that Lévi-
Strauss finds to credit in the work of Radcliffe-Brown suggests
that the two approaches (British and French) are convergent
and complementary. Both give greater attention to one dimen-
sion of human life at the expense of the other.
It is hoped that this paper has brought out the merits of
an approach which avoids taking up a polar position in this
respect. Geertz's awareness of the pitfalls involved in not recog-
nizing the mutual relations of the actual and the normativo
is well exemplified in his refusal to accept the subjectivism
inherent in a phenomenological analysis of religion. Transcen
dental phenomenology, in the Husserlian modo, does tend to
«placo the stress on a supposed inner state of the actor rather
than on a certain sort of relation —a symbolically mediated
one— between an actor and his situation» (Geertz 1966). For
symbols are the link between the constitued and the constitu
tivo, the model «of» (what is) and the model «for» (what could
be), and they shape social life as forcibly as DNA shapes organic
functionning. The comparison of gene and symbol is, indeed,
as Geertz states, «more than a strained analogy» (Geertz 1966).
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